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Abstract 
During and after the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, the growth cycle of Vietnam’s economy has shifted from an 
average annual growth rate of 7%-8% to an average annual growth rate of 5%-6% with a high level of macroeconomic 
instability and uncertainty from 2009 till 2016. Related studies have speculated that the operations of monetary poli-
cies during this period were not effective in recovering the economic growth and stabilizing the overall price level 
and total output level. This paper provides the first empirical examination of this speculation using the Trilemma 
framework. Our empirical results show that the State Bank of Vietnam has had adopted a set of policies aiming at 
maintaining exchange rate stability and interest rate independence while easing the restrictions on capital inflows. 
The combination of these three monetary policy approaches is found to violate the rule of Trilemma. Consequently, 
exchange rate and interest rate policies became less effective and failed to stabilize the economy in response to the 
global economic recession. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Trilemma suggests that the three overall macro-economic objectives: exchange rate stability, 
free mobility of capital flows, and monetary autonomy cannot be simultaneously attained in an 
open economy. One implication is that a country could only focus on the attainment of two of the 
three triangles of the trilemma. Rich empirical evidence suggests that there exists a trilemma con-
straint in many countries and regions, particularly in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 global finan-
cial crisis, which was characterized by reversals in capital flows, significant economic uncertainty, 
and high financial vulnerabilities (Aizenman et al., 2013; Aizenman & Ito, 2014; Steiner, 2017).  
While the trilemma model has been a toolkit in the domain of international macroeconomic policy, 
Rey (2015) argues that this trilemma has rather become a dilemma where countries must choose 
between monetary policy independence and financial openness, regardless of the exchange rate 
regime. Ligonniere (2018) using data of 161 countries from 1970 to 2013 provides strong empir-
ical evidence to invalidate a gradual move from the trilemma to the dilemma. In fact the design of 
capital controls and their complementarity with other policies are still puzzling (Forbes et al., 
2015; Klein & Shambaugh, 2015). Several studies show a possible combination of the “middle 
ground” approach (Aizenman et al., 2008; Herwartz & Roestel, 2017; Han & Wei, 2018; 
Ligonniere, 2018).  
To the extent that the empirical evidence for the dilemma model is present mainly for developed 
economies, we examine the Trilemma model in the context of Vietnam as a small open economy. 
When relaxing capital inflow restrictions, those small open economies are often left to choose 
between two combinations: the independence of monetary policy with a floating exchange rate or 
a fixed exchange rate and a dependent monetary policy. Many similar economies, while trying to 
maintain both objectives (floating exchange rate and independence of interest rate), have experi-
enced domestic financial crises. Well-known crises which are argued to demonstrate the violation 
of the Trilemma rule include the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-1995, the Asian financial crisis of 
1997–1998, and the Argentinean financial collapse of 2001-2002 (Aizenman, 2010). 
More specifically, we employ the approach of Aizenman et al. (2008) to quantify the Trilemma 
Index for Vietnam and, by doing so, provide answers to several research questions. First, we ex-
amine whether the Trilemma rule had been violated under the monetary policy management of 
the State Bank of Vietnam. Second, we assess whether the violation of the Trilemma rule might 
have contributed to the slowdown of macroeconomic performance since 2007. Third, what would 
be the impact on macroeconomic performance if the SBV had retained the same policy setting 
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used during the period 1998-2006 for the latter period 2007-2013? Lastly, we assess the linkages 
between the Trilemma rule and the two most important macroeconomic targets of Vietnam’s mon-
etary policies: economic growth and inflation. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background on Vietnam’s 
economy, which constitutes an interesting case study for the empirical examination of the Tri-
lemma model in the context of small open economies in the face of strong economic growth and 
increasing impacts from the global economy. Section 3 provides a concise review of the Trilemma 
model. Section 4 discusses the empirical methodology. Section 5 reports and discusses the results. 
Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. BACKGROUND ON VIETNAM ECONOMY 
Since the launch of the “Doi Moi” (Renovation) programs in 1986 with a series of policies to shift 
the economy away from the central-planning system, markets have gradually been created for 
most of goods and services. The GDP growth rate was sustained at 7%-8% annually on average 
(giving Vietnam the second fastest growing economy in Asia, after China) since then. Vietnam’s 
economy has also become more integrated economically and financially with the global economy 
and has experienced important structural changes with a shift from agriculture to industry and 
services.1 Notably, the contribution of the agriculture sector dropped from 38.7% to 20.9% of 
GDP between 1990 and 2005, while that of the industry and the construction sector grew from 
22.7% to 41.1%. Thanks to strong economic growth from 1990 to 2007, Vietnam became one of 
the most successful examples of poverty alleviation in the developing world and was also called 
the “new tiger of Asia” (Sepehri & Akram-Lodhi, 2002; Mahadevan & Hoang, 2016). 
[ Insert Figure 1 here ] 
Vietnam’s economy has, however, struggled between 2007 and 2016, with significant macroeco-
nomic instability, volatile trading activity, and a high level of non-performing loans in the banking 
system. In particular, the GDP growth rate slowed down to 5%-6% annually, with a high inflation 
rate climbing to 23% in 2008 and then remaining above 10% from 2009 to 2011 (Figure 1). The 
 
1 Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995, the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) in 1998, signed a Bilateral Trade Agreement with 
the United States in 2000, and became a member of World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2006. Two FTAs of the 
third generation, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the EU-
VN FTA, were recently signed, with the CPTPP coming into effect on the 31st of December 2018. 
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ratio of public debt to GDP increased from 30% in 2001 to over 50% in 2010. Rising commodity 
prices and the dramatic surge in the price of oil have contributed to a sharp rise in the consumer 
price index (Nguyen et al., 2012). In the reality, high inflation and high interest rates caused severe 
damage to the domestic economy through affecting the confidence of households and firms who 
reduced their consumption and investment. The banking system was frozen as a consequence of 
the increased amount of non-performing loans and illiquidity following the global financial crisis 
and the collapse of the housing markets in 2011.2 On the other hand, the exchange rate depreciated 
by 25% between 2007 and 2011, coupled with a deficit in the current account that was growing 
each year. Foreign reserves, which reached 25 billion USD in 2007, fell to 12 billion USD in 2010. 
The stock market crashed from its record of 1100 index points in 2007 to 240 index points in 2009 
and fluctuated in the range of 400-450 in 2010-2011.  
[ Insert Figures 2 and 3 here ] 
It is obvious that while the 2008-2009 global financial crisis had undoubtedly a range of negative 
effects on Vietnam’s economy, other economies in Asia similar to Vietnam received much less 
impact, as shown in Figure 2. Some recent studies have argued that those macroeconomic insta-
bilities were caused mainly by an inappropriate implementation of monetary policies by the State 
Bank of Vietnam (SBV) (Pham, 2011; To et al., 2012). For example, observed data showed that 
the SBV responded to the increasing inflation by doubling the refinancing rate for commercial 
banks from 6.5% in December 2007 to 15% by June 2008 (see Figure 3). Inflation was brought 
down quickly from its August 2008 peak of over 28% to a low of 2% in August 2009. However, 
fearing a recession risk, the SBV decided to cut the refinancing rate to 7% in order to re-stimulate 
the economy in January 2009, which has led the inflation rate to soar afterwards and reach a peak 
of 23% in August 2011.  
In sum, the policy responses of the SBV to address the recessionary risk and the global crisis 
transmission were at stake and seem to have been a source of general macroeconomic instability. 
Our results support this assessment as the Trilemma rule was violated in the near-crisis situation 
during the years from 2007 to 2009. This finding helps explain why the SBV’s efforts in stabiliz-
ing exchange rates and interest rates were unlikely to have a significant impact on inflation. The 
policy setting during 1998-2006 is also found to be unsuitable for 2007-2013. Moreover, we find 
 
2 Non-performing loans were estimated at 250 trillion VND (equivalent to 12 billion USD or 10% GDP) in 2012 with 
a record number of bankrupt firms (Vu 2012). 
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that when Vietnam’s economy was still relatively closed, the SBV could have used regular mon-
etary instruments such as the interest rate and the exchange rate to effectively control inflation. In 
contrast, when the economy became more open, the monetary policy should have considered the 
influence from the increased financial openness as it can affect inflation. Lastly, a policy stabiliz-
ing the exchange rate could be more effective than policies that reduce interest rates and increase 
financial openness in promoting economic growth.  
3. THE TRILEMMA MODEL 
The term Trilemma (Impossible Trinity) became popular after the work by Mundell (1963) and 
Fleming (1962) on the choice of exchange rate regime.3 The Trilemma rule implies that an econ-
omy cannot simultaneously maintain exchange rate stability, free capital movement, and inde-
pendent monetary policy at the same time. Feenstra and Taylor (2011) propose a simple explana-
tion of the Trilemma phenomenon by introducing a system of three equations in which each policy 
goal can be expressed as follows:   
(1) Fixed	exchange	rate:	
!
!
"!
!
= 0,  
where E refers to the exchange rate between the domestic currency and the foreign currency, and 
Ee is the expected exchange rate in the future. In a fixed exchange rate regime, a country tries to 
keep a fixed or maintain a relatively stable/small change in the value of the currency (zero or 
stable/small depreciation or appreciation).  
 (2) Free	capital	movement:	𝑖 = 𝑖# +
!
!
"!
!
   
International capital mobility is considered a crucial device to encourage integration, efficiency, 
and risk sharing. To follow this policy, the country maintains the freedom for investors to bring 
money in and out, implying they can buy and sell the currency whenever and in whatever quanti-
ties they want. With the adjustment from the Uncovered Interest Parity rule, the market will set 
and adjust the exchange rate as the result of arbitrage activities. Equation (2) describes the equi-
librium position, when the difference between the domestic interest rate (i) and the international 
interest rate (iF) must be equal to the change of the exchange rate level. 
 (3) An	independent	monetary	policy:	𝑖 ≠ 𝑖#     
 
3 In 1997, Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) brought the term “Trilemma” into widespread use within economics, an alter-
native to the longer phrase of “impossible trinity”. 
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With monetary policy independence, the country can set the domestic interest rate independently 
of the international interest rate (and this will definitely affect the exchange rate). Monetary policy 
autonomy is desired in managing the domestic economy’s business cycle (and other economic 
disturbances). 
Mathematically the three equations (1), (2) and (3), cannot be satisfied simultaneously. For exam-
ple, if equations (1) and (2) hold, that makes 𝑖 = 𝑖# which means that equation (3) is impossible. 
Under the implication of the Trilemma, a country must either forego exchange rate stability to 
maintain a degree of monetary independence or forego monetary independence to retain exchange 
rate stability. The application of the Trilemma is most obvious when the policies are at the ends 
of a spectrum such as (i) hard peg or free float, (ii) perfect capital mobility or total immobility, or 
(iii) complete autonomy or no autonomy at all. 
In practice, a country might not absolutely sit at one of those three “corners”. In other words, the 
rigidity of the peg, the degree of capital mobility, and the independence of monetary policy could 
be partial rather than full (Feenstra & Taylor, 2011). For example, countries like Australia or the 
United States choose independent monetary policy and free capital flows and allow exchange rates 
to fluctuate freely, whereas China tries to maintain stable exchange rates and independent mone-
tary policy, thus requiring restrictions on capital flows (Mankiw, 2010). Figure 4 provides a graph-
ical presentation of the Trilemma rule for several countries. 
[ Insert Figure 4 here ] 
Over the recent decades, many developing countries have opted for increasing financial integra-
tion to boost economic growth. Hence, those countries had to pursue higher capital mobility as 
the obvious choice. Under the Trilemma rule, this leaves them to lean toward either an independ-
ence of monetary policy (with a floating exchange rate) or a fixed exchange rate (without inde-
pendent monetary policy). Many countries tried to maintain both objectives and unfortunately fell 
into financial crises as observed in the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-1995, the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997-1998, and the Argentinean financial collapse of 2001-2002 (Aizenman, 2010). These fi-
nancial crises prompted economists to think about ways to transform the Trilemma rule into usable 
applications to evaluate the performance of monetary policy.  
Aizenman et al. (2008) propose to quantify the Trilemma index as a measurement of the stance of 
monetary policy setting in relation to the following three policies: the monetary independence 
(MI, measured as the reciprocal of the correlation of the interest rates between the home country 
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and the base country), the exchange rate stability (ERS, measured as a normalized formula of the 
annual standard deviations of the monthly exchange rate between the home country and the base 
country), and the capital account openness. Each of these measures are defined as below:  
(4) 𝑀𝐼 = 1 −
!"##$%!,%"'(((*)
*(((*)
 
where ii refers to the monthly market interest rates of the home country, ij refers to the monthly 
market interest rates of the base country, and corr$𝑖# , 𝑖$' is their annual correlation.  
(5)  𝐸𝑅𝑆 =
,.,*
,.,*./0123(∆(5"6(2789_;<02))
 
Capital account openness is proxied by the financial openness/integration (𝐾𝐴𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 ) index  
which is calculated as a combination of dummy variables assigned to policy restrictions including 
the presence of multiple exchange rates (k1), restrictions on current account transactions (k2), 
restrictions on capital account transactions (k3), and the requirement of the surrender of export 
proceeds (k4).  
Note that all these three measures take values ranging between 0 and 1. Higher values for MI, 
ERS, KAOPEN suggest more monetary independence, a more stable exchange rate and more fi-
nancial openness respectively. 
Using the data for 181 countries over the period 1970-2006, Aizenman et al. (2008) confirm the 
notion that a rise in one Trilemma aspect should be traded off with a drop of the weighted sum of 
the other two. They report three important findings for developing countries: i) the output volatil-
ity could be reduced by a higher monetary independence or a lower exchange rate stability; ii) 
higher monetary independence, lower exchange rate stability or lower financial openness are all 
associated with a higher level of inflation; and iii) keeping a stable exchange rate with financial 
development at a medium level can lead to an increase in output volatility. 
The empirical approach of Aizenman et al. (2008) has been applied to several developing and 
developed economies. Using quarterly data for India from 1996 to 2009, Hutchison et al. (2012) 
estimate the Trilemma indices for each of the three policy objectives: monetary policy independ-
ence, exchange rate stability, and capital account openness (financial integration). They confirm 
the existence of the Trilemma rule in India: an increase in capital account openness has come at 
the cost of reduction in monetary policy independence or of limitations on exchange rate stability. 
Similarly, Cortuk and Singh (2011), applying a similar approach for Turkey using quarterly data 
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from 1998 to 2010, show the existence of the Trilemma rule and the changing roles of three Tri-
lemma policies in different periods of time. Particularly, monetary independence and exchange 
rate stability have diminishing effects on inflation, while capital openness has an increasing effect. 
In a similar manner, using annual data for Greece from 1970 to 2010, Hsing (2012) finds the 
tradeoff among exchange rate stability, monetary independence and financial integration.  
Vietnam has been included in a group of several economies in the empirical Trilemma literature 
(Aizenman et al., 2011; Aizenman & Ito, 2014; Aizenman et al., 2016). In those studies, the data 
for Vietnam were pooled in as part of a bigger panel dataset comprising several countries4. Given 
that the characteristics of the Vietnamese financial system, macroeconomic conditions, and, more 
importantly, Vietnam’s policy responses, are very different from those of other countries, the re-
ported results in those studies are more relevant for the group of countries as a whole and might 
hide many particular policy features specific to Vietnam. The only empirical application of Tri-
lemma analysis to Vietnam as a single country is the study by Ho and Ho (2018), but it focuses 
on the movements of Trilemma policies before and after the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and 
does not take further steps to estimate the impact of these policies on main macroeconomic indi-
cators.  
4. DATA DESCRIPTION 
As stated earlier, we employ the model proposed by Aizenman et al. (2008) to quantify the Tri-
lemma Index for Vietnam between 1998 and 2013. Instead of yearly data in the context of cross-
country analysis as carried out in Aizenman et al. (2008), we use monthly data with the hope that 
our results will provide more useful information for policy considerations. 
4.1 MEASURING MONETARY INDEPENDENCE (MI) 
Following Aizenman et al. (2008), 𝑀𝐼 is measured based on the correlation between ii, interest 
rates in the home country (Vietnam), and ij, interest rates in the base country (the United States): 
(6)  𝑀𝐼 =
*(!"##$%!,%"'
=
 
 
4 The group includes Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thai-
land, and Vietnam. 
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where ii is the refinancing rate when commercial banks ask for loans from the SBV and ij is the 
effective funds rate, similar to the policy rate from the Federal Reserve (Fed).5  
The United States was chosen as the base country because the US dollar is the dominant foreign 
currency in Vietnamese markets, with almost all international transactions denominated in USD. 
That said, a change in the international value of US dollars, for example initiated by an adjustment 
of the Fed funds rate, would directly affect the foreign exchange market in Vietnam.  
We estimate monthly correlations between it and ij (corr(ii,ij)) from daily data.6 As the values of 
corr(ii,ij) would range in [-1,1], the value of 𝑀𝐼 would lie in [0,1]. When corr(ii,ij)=-1, this means 
that the two interest rates were moved/adjusted in opposite ways. For example, the Fed increased 
ij by 1% and at the same time the SBV decreased ii by 1%. In this case, 𝑀𝐼 =1 reflects that the 
way the SBV adjusted its policy rate was totally independent of the Fed’s operation. Similarly, 
when corr(ii,ij)=1, the two interest rates were moved/adjusted in the same direction, for example 
the Fed increased ij by 1% and at the same time the SBV increased ii by 1%. In this case, 𝑀𝐼 = 0 
implies that the way the SBV adjusted its policy rate was totally dependent on the Fed’s policy. 
Figure 5 depicts the 𝑀𝐼 index between January 1998 and December 2013. It shows that the SBV’s 
interest rate policy was relatively independent from the Fed prior to 2004, since the values fluctu-
ated around 0.5. Since then, the 𝑀𝐼 index has experienced swings of higher magnitude. The sim-
ple linear trend line of 𝑀𝐼 suggests that the interest rate policy conducted by the State Bank of 
Vietnam was gradually adjusted towards a less independent stance. 
[ Insert Figure 5 here ] 
4.2 MEASURING EXCHANGE RATE STABILITY (ES) 
Following Aizenman et al. (2008), we measure the exchange rate stability (𝐸𝑆) by using the 
monthly standard deviations of daily logarithmic change in the exchange rate between the Viet-
namese dongs and the US dollar, ∆(log(𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ$%&')), as follows
7: 
(7)   𝐸𝑆 =
,.,*
,.,*./0123(∆(5"6(2789_;<02))
 
 
5  Historical Data Fed Interest Rates, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Retrieved from: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm (Accessed on 1/9/2015) 
6 For example, corr(ii,ij) of January 2000 is calculated from correlation of 31 daily observations in that month. 
7 Aizenman et al. (2008) use the annual standard deviations of the monthly log-change in the exchange rate. 
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where ∆(log(𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ$%&')) = 	 log(𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)& − log(𝑒𝑥𝑐ℎ_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)&"(. If 𝐸𝑆 = 1, the exchange rate 
was kept fixed during the period. Otherwise, any significant and frequent adjustments to exchange 
rates would translate into bigger values of the standard deviation, which in turn lowers the value 
of 𝐸𝑆. For example, if the monthly standard deviation is equal to 0.01, 𝐸𝑆 is equal to 0.5 and 
reflects the fact that the exchange rate deviated by 1% from its mean value over the month. We 
used daily USD/VND exchange rate data taken from OANDA database to calculate the 𝐸𝑆	index 
for Vietnam.8  
[ Insert Figure 6 here ] 
Figure 6 depicts the performance of the 𝐸𝑆 index between January 1998 and December 2013. It 
shows that the SBV’s exchange rate policy was quite stable and independent (score closely to 1 
point) over two distinct periods: from 1998 until mid-2000 and then from early-2002 until the end 
of 2004. The performance of the 𝐸𝑆 index fluctuated widely between 2005 and 2007, then became 
more stable again from 2008 until the end of the study sample. However, the level of independence 
was sharply reduced as the index fluctuated around 0.6 on average. The trend line of the 𝐸𝑆 shows 
that exchange rate policy was significantly adjusted towards a more flexible stance between 1998 
and 2013. 
4.3 MEASURING FINANCIAL OPENNESS (FO) 
To measure the financial openness (𝐹𝑂) index, this study follows the approach of Abdul et al. 
(2010) in quantifying the financial liberalization index whereby 𝐹𝑂 is defined as the combination 
of four separate aspects as follows: 
(8)   𝐹𝑂 =
>%.>&.>'.>(
*=
 
where 𝛼(, 𝛼),	𝛼*, and 𝛼+  capture respectively restrictions in the foreign exchange market, re-
strictions of entry for foreign financial institutions, restrictions on international capital flows, and 
restrictions for foreign investors in securities markets. 
Information about the above restrictions was taken from the Annual Report on Exchange Arrange-
ments and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER - International Monetary Fund). Each aspect was as-
signed a grade between 0-3 (0 for totally restricted and 3 for totally free/open) based on the current 
 
8 Historical Data on Currency Exchange Rate, OANDA - Forex Trading and Exchange Rates Services. Retrieved 
from: www.oanda.com (Accessed on 1/9/2015) 
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status of openness. Then, the aspect points were added up and divided by 12 (the maximum pos-
sible number) to obtain the final index. Accordingly, the value of 𝐹𝑂 ranges from 0 (no flow at 
all) to 1 (free flows). More details regarding its measurement are presented in Appendix A.  
[ Insert Figure 7 here ] 
As shown in Figure 7, international capital flows were relatively restricted in Vietnam over the 
period prior to 2005. In 2006, the government began to remove the barriers to these restrictions 
and during the same period, the securities market also experienced great expansion. However, 
from 2012, the progress reversed, potentially explained by the consequence of high inflation and 
high risk of crisis transmission since 2009.  
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
5.1 TESTING THE TRILEMMA RULE 
Aizenman et al. (2008) propose to test the Trilemma hypothesis by estimating a regression model 
(without a constant term), presented in equation (9), where the dependent variable is a constant 
number 𝐶 and the three indices are used as independent variables, such as: 
(9) 𝐶 = 𝑎(𝑀𝐼& + 𝑎)𝐸𝑆& + 𝑎*𝐹𝑂& + ε&    
Note that the regression results would be the same for any given value of 𝐶. However, 𝐶 is chosen 
to be 2 in order to hypothetically reflect the nature of the Trilemma phenomenon. According to 
the rule, only a combination of two out of three policies can be maintained at the same time, so it 
is reasonable to assume that the combination of three measures of the three policies might be equal 
to 2 when scores for each aspect lie in the range [0,1]. 
The literature is often based on a high value of the coefficient of determination (adjusted 𝑅)) and 
the statistical significance of the coefficients	(𝑎(, 𝑎), 𝑎*) to conclude that there is empirical evi-
dence in favor of the position that the Trilemma rule is effective and that a linear specification is 
applicable to explain the "binding" characteristic of those three policy indicators. Otherwise, one 
can argue that the Trilemma rule is not effective or that the linkage among the three policy indi-
cators is nonlinear. 
We divide the whole sample period into two sub-periods: from January 1998 to December 2006 
and from January 2007 to December 2013. The date 1 January 2007 is chosen as the break point 
because many policies related to economic liberalization came into effect on this date, as Vietnam 
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officially joined the WTO and a structural break test has confirmed this choice9. Error! Reference 
source not found. presents the estimates of equation (9) for two sub-periods and for the whole 
sample. All coefficients are highly statistically significant at the 99% confidence levels with high 
values of the adjusted 𝑅). These results suggest the relatively high goodness-of-fit of the empirical 
models under consideration.  
[ Insert Table 1 here ] 
The values of the estimated coefficients of 𝑀𝐼, 𝐸𝑆, and 𝐹𝑂 in Error! Reference source not 
found. show empirical evidence of the trade-off among the three policy goals. The predictions 
using the estimated coefficients and the actual values for the variables, such as	𝑎V(𝑀𝐼&, 𝑎V)𝐸𝑆& and 
𝑎V*𝐹𝑂& provide more information on the weights with which each policy goal was considered by 
the macro policy settings. More specifically, Figure 8 shows different predictions of each two out 
of three policy indicators (i.e., 𝑀𝐼𝐸𝑆 = 𝑎V(𝑀𝐼& + 𝑎V)𝐸𝑆&, 𝐸𝑆𝐹𝑂 = 𝑎V)𝐸𝑆& + 𝑎V*𝐹𝑂&, and 𝑀𝐼𝐹𝑂 =
𝑎V(𝑀𝐼& + 𝑎V*𝐹𝑂&) for the two sub-periods 1998-2006 and 2007-2013. 
[ Insert Figure 8 here ] 
Between 1998 and 2006 (Model 1), the combination of higher exchange rate stability and more 
financial openness (i.e., the predicted value of 𝐸𝑆𝐹𝑂) was the dominant bundle until the combi-
nation of monetary independence and financial openness (i.e., the predicted value of 𝑀𝐼𝐹𝑂) in-
creased in popularity in late 2006. For the period 2007-2013 (Model 2), the combination of mon-
etary independence and exchange rate stability has received more weight in setting monetary pol-
icy because the predicted value for 𝑀𝐼𝐸𝑆 increased slightly in comparison with 𝐸𝑆𝐹𝑂 and 𝑀𝐼𝐹𝑂. 
As 𝐸𝑆𝐹𝑂 and 𝑀𝐼𝐹𝑂 always stayed over 𝑀𝐼𝐸𝑆 for the entire period from 1998 to 2013, the em-
pirical results suggest that controlling the capital flows appears to have been the top priority of 
the government. On the other hand, monetary independence has received less priority, though its 
presence has increased slightly in the second period of 2007-2013. 
5.2 TESTING THE STABILITY OF TRILEMMA INDEX  
Figure 9 shows the movement of the Trilemma index which was calculated using the fitted values 
for the period 1998-2013 (Model 3). This series reflects the fluctuation of the combined values of 
the three Trilemma policy indicators over time around a constant value 𝐶 = 2. The addition of a 
 
9 Test result will be provided upon request. 
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polynomial smoother line (Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing) helps to detect three 
different periods of distinct performance of the Trilemma index.  
[ Insert Figure 9 here ] 
We first observe that, from early 1998 to late 2003, the Trilemma index was relatively stable. 
Second, from early 2004 to late 2007, the index made a V-shape trend line with values fluctuating 
in a zone between 1.5 and 2, and rarely going higher than 2. Third, from early 2008 up to late 
2013, the index shows bigger fluctuations with the average values frequently higher than 2. These 
results indicate that the Trilemma index from 2008 onwards was less stable than in the previous 
period, as the value of the index fluctuated in higher and wider ranges, suggesting the violation of 
the Trilemma rule in the latter period. 
An interesting question that arises is what would happen to the Trilemma index if the SBV had 
maintained the same set of policies from one period to another one? To answer this question, we 
used the coefficients for 𝑀𝐼, 𝐸𝑆, 𝐹𝑂 estimated from data for the first period 1998-2006 to calcu-
late the Trilemma index for the entire period 1998-2013. Similarly, the coefficients estimated from 
the latter period 2007-2013 were used to calculate the Trilemma index for the entire sample. The 
results in Figure 10 show that when the estimated coefficients from 1998-2006 are applied to the 
whole series, the fitted values for 2007-2013 increased to the range of 3-3.5 (left figure), whereas 
the fitted values for 1998-2006 are stable around 1.7 when the estimated coefficients from 2007-
2013 are filled in (right figure). 
[ Insert Figure 10 here ] 
The results in Figure 10 provide several important implications. First, the combination of Tri-
lemma policies in 1998-2006 seem more stable than that in 2007-2013. More importantly, if the 
combination of the Trilemma policies in 1998-2006 is assumed to be optimal (𝐶 = 2), this bundle 
would violate the Trilemma rule if it was applied for 2007-2013 (when the fitted value of 𝐶 
reached 3-3.5). In contrast, the violation of the Trilemma rule was not observed if the combination 
of policies in the latter period 2007-2013 is applied for the former period 1998-2006 because the 
fitted value of the constant reduced stability to around 1.7. 
[ Insert Figure 11 here ] 
It is worth noting that the initial findings for the stability of the Trilemma policies appear to be 
well correlated with the relatively good macroeconomic performance between 1998 and 2006 and 
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the instability of macroeconomic conditions after 2007, reflected in higher inflation and lower 
industrial production trends (see Figure 11). It thus raises the question as to whether the stability 
in those policies might have contributed to the stability of the economy. We provide further evi-
dence in sub-section 4.3. 
5.3 IMPACTS OF TRILEMMA POLICIES ON INFLATION  
To analyze the interaction between the Trilemma policies and the inflation rate, we follow 
Aizenman et al. (2008) and estimate the following model: 
(10) 𝐼𝑛𝑓& 	= 𝑎, + (𝑎(𝐼𝑛𝑓&"() + 𝑎)𝑀𝐼& + 𝑎*𝐸𝑆& + 𝑎+𝐹𝑂& + 𝑎-𝑅𝐸𝑆& + ɛ& 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑓& captures two aspects of inflation: the inflation rate (𝑐𝑝𝑖_𝑔) measured as the monthly 
growth rate of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the inflation volatility (𝑠𝑡𝑑_𝑐𝑝𝑖) measured as 
the forward 12-month standard deviation of 𝑐𝑝𝑖_𝑔. Those volatility variables are constructed 
based on the assumption that changes in Trilemma policies might take up to 12 months to exert 
their full impact on macroeconomic indicators. The inclusion of 𝑐𝑝𝑖_𝑔 and 𝑠𝑡𝑑_𝑐𝑝𝑖 on the left-
hand side of equation (10) is to account for instantaneous and lagged impacts respectively. The 
regression with 𝑐𝑝𝑖_𝑔 expects to reflect possible impacts from the Trilemma policies on inflation 
within the same month while with 𝑠𝑡𝑑_𝑐𝑝𝑖, it is expected to look at the linkages between the 
Trilemma policies and a fluctuation in inflation rates over the next 12 months.     
𝑅𝐸𝑆& is the level of current gross international reserves as a ratio to yearly GDP (summation of 
the previous 12 months of GDP). In line with the argument of Obstfeld et al. (2010), we included 
𝑅𝐸𝑆& in the model as we expect a positive correlation between the amount of foreign reserves and 
the Trilemma policies. The reserve accumulation gives policymakers more flexibility in dealing 
with the short-run trade-offs between monetary independence and exchange rate stability, at a 
given level of financial openness. In short, the more reserves a country has, the higher the Tri-
lemma index it can maintain. 𝐼𝑛𝑓&"( is added to the models in order to account for possible dy-
namic effects. The inclusion of these new variables, however, reduces the range of the sample 
from January 2008 to December 2013 to the period from January 2008 to December 2012. 
[ Insert Table 2 here ] 
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The results in Table 2 show the negative relationships between monetary independence and ex-
change rate stability with the inflation rate; however, those linkages disappear in the second pe-
riod.10 This means that during 1998-2006, the SBV might have increased the independence of 
monetary policy or kept the exchange rate more stable to reduce inflation. Nevertheless, in the 
next period 2007-2012, statistical evidence to support this relationship has disappeared, implying 
that monetary independence and exchange rate stability seem to have lost their influence on infla-
tion. Regarding financial openness, it had no impact on inflation in 1998-2006 but has exerted 
significant influence since 2007. This outcome is quite reasonable given the fact that the financial 
openness curve is almost unchanged during 1998-2006. The statistical evidence of a strong posi-
tive relationship between inflation and financial openness is quite noticeable. Although we might 
need a more robust regression to confirm the linkage, the statistical result still provides some 
evidence to support the hypothesis that financial openness played some role in the turmoil of the 
inflation rate during 2007-2012. 
Estimated coefficients for international reserves (𝑅𝐸𝑆) have no statistical impact on inflation in 
both sub-periods, suggesting that foreign exchange market intervention might not be an effective 
tool in either mitigating the Trilemma trade-off or reducing inflation. However, 𝑅𝐸𝑆 is particu-
larly significant in explaining the volatility of inflation, implying that foreign exchange interven-
tion could play some role in decreasing the fluctuation of price level. This outcome might also 
reflect the fact that the Vietnam markets and financial system are still affected by dollarization. 
5.4 IMPACTS OF TRILEMMA POLICIES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH  
Interactions between the Trilemma policies and economic growth can be predicted by the follow-
ing model: 
(11) 𝑔𝑑𝑝& 	= 𝑎, + (𝑎(𝑔𝑑𝑝&"() + 𝑎)𝑀𝐼& + 𝑎*𝐸𝑆& + 𝑎+𝐹𝑂& + 𝑎-𝑅𝐸𝑆& + ɛ&  
where economic growth11, 𝑔𝑑𝑝&, is measured in two forms: growth rate (𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑔) as monthly real 
GDP growth rates and growth volatility (𝑠𝑡𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝) as forward 12-month standard deviation of 
𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑔.  
 
10 The VIF tests show that none of the models in Table 2 and Table 3 in Section 5.4 suffers from multicollinearity 
issues. Results of the test could be provided upon request addressed to the corresponding author. 
11 As monthly data for GDP is unavailable, the data for GDP in this section is interpolated from a combination of 
quarterly GDP data and monthly growth of industrial production index using the technique developed by Denton 
(1971) 
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The results of the estimations, presented in Table 3, show that only exchange rate stability has a 
negative link with GDP growth rate while there is no significant influence from monetary inde-
pendence and financial openness. However, it is quite interesting to see that higher exchange rate 
stability leads to lower economic growth in both periods 1998-2006 and 2007-2012 periods. This 
finding is further strengthened by the growth volatility regression indicating that lower growth 
fluctuation during 2007-2012 is associated with higher exchange rate stability. In short, these re-
sults suggest that trying to stabilize the exchange rate was unlikely to lead to higher economic 
growth during 1998-2012. 
The impact of monetary independence is statistically insignificant in all economic growth regres-
sions, while financial openness only influences growth volatility during 2007-2012. The insignif-
icant impact of monetary independence is unexpected but is explainable given the fact that the 
interest rate is not the ultimate objective of monetary policy in Vietnam (To et al., 2012). 
[ Insert Table 3 here ] 
Similar to the inflation regressions, international reserves have no significant impact on economic 
growth but strongly affect growth volatility in both sub-periods. To some extent, the positive re-
lationship between international reserves and growth volatility indicates that foreign exchange 
intervention might help to maintain economic growth stability. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Mundell-Fleming trilemma suggests that a country has three policy options in setting mone-
tary policy, by combining either two of fixed exchange rates, free capital flows, and monetary 
policy independence. In this paper, we performed a quantitative analysis of the Trilemma indices 
for Vietnam to provide insights about the policy framework that has been employed by the State 
Bank of Vietnam in order to cope with the harmful effects of the global financial crisis, macroe-
conomic instability, and rising market uncertainty. Our study covers the period from 1998 to 2013 
and obtained several important findings.  
Our results show that prior to 2005, the exchange rate was maintained in a relatively fixed manner, 
while financial openness was nearly constant. From 2006 onwards, financial openness has in-
creased gradually, and the exchange rate has become more volatile. This would indicate that the 
SBV might have found it easier to keep the exchange rate at the desired level because the capital 
account was still in a restricted mode. The capital account opening put great pressure on the way 
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the SBV controls the exchange rate. Additionally, it might raise the question about the appropri-
ateness of the exchange rate regime the SBV has used since 2006, and whether or not the regime 
is suitable to the changing conditions of the domestic economy, as well as the international finan-
cial system following the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. 
Second, the implementation of the Trilemma policies was less volatile in 1998-2006 than in 2007-
2014. There was indeed a shock in the progression of the Trilemma index between 2006 and 2007, 
which lead us to believe that the Trilemma rule was violated suddenly. This result leads us to 
speculate that while easing the restrictions on capital inflows, the SBV still tried to maintain ex-
change rate stability and interest rate independence concurrently. This policy setting would see 
insufficiently sterilized capital inflows, thus causing high inflation and negative impacts on the 
domestic financial system.   
Third, between 1998 and 2006, the interest rate and the exchange rate policies showed some sig-
nificant linkages with the inflation rate. However, those linkages disappeared over the period 
2007-2012 as only financial openness exerted a significant impact on inflation rate. This finding 
suggests that when the economy was still relatively closed, the SBV could use regular monetary 
instruments such as the interest rate and exchange rate to effectively control inflation. By contrast, 
when the economy became more open, external forces from the increased financial openness ap-
pear to have had more of an impact on inflation. 
Lastly, exchange rate stability proved to be the most effective policy to manage the trends and 
volatility of economic growth. The effects from the interest rate and financial openness policies 
were unclear and insignificant. This finding suggests that the SBV should have to pay more atten-
tion to its exchange rate policy. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Empirical Evidence of Trilemma Violation 
Time period 1998-2006 (Model 1) 2007-2013 (Model 2) 1998-2013 (Model 3) 
MI (coefficient) 0.275* 0.632*** 1.804*** 
MI (standard error) (0.149) (0.123) (0.174) 
ES (coefficient) 0.452*** 0.917*** 0.679*** 
ES (standard error) (0.054) (0.111) (0.087) 
FO (coefficient) 4.302*** 1.800*** 1.170*** 
FO (standard error) (0.160) (0.130) (0.094) 
BIC -197.146 -166.537 -74.932 
Sample size 108 84 192 
R2 0.9979 0.9982 0.9907 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2: Estimation Results for Inflation Model 
 Inflation rate Inflation rate Inflation volatility Inflation volatility 
 1998-2006 2007-2012 1998-2006 2007-2012 
Inft-1 0.159 0.630***   
 (0.096) (0.095)   
MI -0.029* 0.008 0.010*** -0.007 
  (0.013) (0.018) (0.002) (0.005) 
ES -0.016* 0.005 -0.001 0.002 
  (0.007) (0.014) (0.001) (0.004) 
FO -0.04 0.028*** -0.005 -0.004 
  (0.037) (0.029) (0.005) (0.008) 
RES 0.001 0.016 -0.009* 0.020*** 
 (0.024) (0.015) (0.003) (0.004) 
_Cons 0.014 -0.025 0.006* 0.008 
 (0.016) (0.026) (0.002) (0.007) 
R2 0.143 0.43 0.403 0.45 
p-value 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 
df_r 101 66 103 67 
BIC -724.603 -474.21 -1161.77 -670.562 
Sample size 107 72 108 72 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (standard errors are shown in parentheses below the individual coefficient 
estimates). 
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Table 3: Estimation Results for Growth Model  
 Growth rate Growth rate Growth volatility Growth volatility 
 1998-2006 2007-2012 1998-2006 2007-2012 
gdpt-1 0.219* 0.234   
 (0.094) (0.121)   
MI -0.175 -0.028 -0.015 -0.044 
  (0.222) (0.353) (0.015) (0.029) 
ES -0.011* -0.023** 0.000 -0.105*** 
  (0.117) (0.279) (0.008) (0.023) 
FO -0.104 -0.305 -0.03 0.372*** 
  (0.672) (0.581) (0.046) (0.048) 
RES -0.168 -0.087 0.061* 0.217*** 
 (0.445) (0.299) (0.030) (0.025) 
_Cons 0.177 0.254 0.147*** -0.05 
 (0.294) (0.505) (0.020) (0.042) 
r2 0.058 0.056 0.101 0.658 
p-value 0.297 0.56 0.026 0.000 
df_r 101 66 103 67 
BIC -103.769 -45.432 -689.365 -406.579 
Sample size 107 72 108 72 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (standard errors are shown in parentheses below the individual coefficient 
estimates). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: GDP growth, current account balance and inflation rate in 1993-201212 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Inflation rates in ASEAN economies13
 
 
 
 
12 Data are sourced from World Development Indicators Database and Global Development Finance. 
13 Data are sourced from World Development Indicators Database and Global Development Finance. 
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Figure 3: Reactions from State Bank of Vietnam 
 
 
Figure 4: Trilemma rule in various nations14 
 
 
 
 
14 Adapted from Aizenman and Ito (2014) 
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Figure 5: Monetary Independence Index15 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Exchange Rate Stability Index16 
 
 
15 The index is smoothed out by taking the seven-month moving averages encompassing the preceding three-months 
concurrently, and the following three months of each observation. 
16 The index is smoothed out by taking the seven-month moving averages encompassing the preceding three-months 
concurrently, and the following three months of each observation. 
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Figure 7: Financial Openness Index 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Combinations of Trilemma Policy indicators 
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Figure 9: The stability of Trilemma index 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: The stability of Trilemma index in two sub-periods 1998-2006 (left) and 2006-2013 (right) 
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Figure 11: The Performance of Inflation and Industrial Production Index17  
Inflation Industrial Production Index 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 The bold lines is Polynomial trended lines for Inflation and Industrial Production Index respectively. 
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APPENDIX A: CODING RULES FOR THE FREE CAPITAL MOVEMENT INDEX 
1. Restrictions in foreign exchange market 
Coded as 0 whenever a special exchange rate regime for either capital or current account transactions exists. 
Coded as 1 when the surrender of export proceeds is lower than 100%. 
Coded as 2 if there is no requirement on surrender of export proceeds.  
Coded as 3 if no restrictions in foreign exchange activities; foreigners are allowed to bring in/out an equiv-
alent or more than USD 10.000 value in cash. 
2. Restrictions of entry for foreign financial institutions  
Coded as 0 when no entry of foreign banks is allowed.  
Coded as 1 when there are branching restrictions or joint venture is allowed, but the range of activities that 
banks can take consists of only banking activities; and nonresidents must hold less than 50 percent equity 
share.  
Coded as 2 when the majority of share of equity ownership of domestic banks by nonresidents is allowed; 
or equal treatment is ensured for both foreign banks and domestic banks; or an unlimited number of 
branches is allowed for foreign banks. 
Coded as 3 when there are no branching restrictions; all banks are allowed to become universal banks. 
3. Restrictions on international capital flows 
Coded as 0 when significant restrictions exist on both capital inflows and outflows. 
Coded as 1 when slight restrictions exist on either capital inflows or outflows. 
Coded as 2 when no restrictions applied to either capital inflows or outflows. 
Coded as 3 when banks are allowed to borrow from abroad freely without restrictions and there are no tight 
restrictions on other capital inflows. 
4. Restrictions for foreign investors on securities markets  
Coded as 0 if there is no securities market.  
Coded as 1 when a securities market is starting to form with the introduction of auctioning of T-bills or the 
establishment of a security commission; foreign equity ownership is allowed but only if less than 50 per-
cent. 
Coded as 2 when further measures have been taken to develop securities markets (tax exemptions, intro-
duction of medium and long-term government bonds in order to build the benchmark of a yield curve, 
policies to develop corporate bond and equity markets, or the introduction of a primary dealer system to 
develop government security markets); majority equity share of foreign ownership is allowed.  
Coded as 3 when further policy measures have been taken to develop derivative markets or to broaden the 
institutional investor base by deregulating portfolio investments and pension funds or completing the full 
deregulation of stock exchanges.  
